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ABSTRACT: This article is concerned with the nature of what federal
legislation calls "the human environment" as a preliminary to under-
standing impacts upon it and risks to it. After discussing the features
that distinguish human systems from others, emphasizing nonmet-
rical aspects of their sociocultural characteristics, eighteen points
concerning risks and impacts are made. The article concludes with a
discussion of the possible place in the human environment of what
Stephen Toulmin calls "post-modern science and risk analysis."
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S TUDIES of risk, under the guiseof environmental impact studies,
have, by legislative mandate, been
part of environmental and resource
planning for several decades now,
and the complex nature of that which
is at risk-the environment has in-
creasingly been recognized. Thus, for
instance, the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act as Amended,’ in ac-
cordance with which the Department
of the Interior leases rights to extract
hydrocarbons from the Outer Conti-
nental Shelf (OSC), requires studies
of risks to what it calls &dquo;the human
environment.&dquo; This term subsumes
not only features of ecosystems re-
lated to human populations but those
populations themselves and their so-
cial, cultural, and economic systems
as well. Because this simple charac-
terization masks enormous complex-
ity, it is necessary to enlarge on the
distinctive nature of human environ-
ments before considering possible
risks to them.
Human systems are complex not
only because they include innumer-
able elements in continuous interac-
tion but also because some of their
components are qualitatively differ-
ent from others. Some, including hu-
mans themselves, are natural prod-
ucts of genetic, geological, and
ecological processes. Others-the so-
ciocultural elements of such systems-
are symbolically conceived and so-
cially constructed. The latter include
their more or less distinctive politi-
cal, legal, economic, social, religious,
recreational, and aesthetic conven-
tions : rules, practices, ways of doing
things standardized by law, custom,
or habitual usage as well as the con-
ceptions, perceptions, and under-
standings on which these rules and
practices are founded. Several points
follow.
First, all human systems can, of
course, be characterized in terms of a
range of fundamental demographic,
economic, physical, and social prop-
erties and activities. Such obvious
and quantifiable variables are those
most often considered in assessments
of the impacts of resource extraction
or other forms of economic develop-
ment on human systems.
But, second, any adequate descrip-
tion of such systems must also con-
sider their social, symbolic, and con-
ceptual elements. Indeed, economic
systems are subsets of social sys-
tems, and inasmuch as they are con-
ventionally established and not
&dquo;naturally&dquo; constituted, they are
themselves social and symbolic in na-
ture, and the value of money is purely
conventional.
The understandings on which con-
ventional rules and practices are
founded are not all narrowly focused
on specific instrumental aspects of
human affairs. They also include
more general and, from the point of
view of the actors, more fundamental
conceptions of morality, equity, jus-
tice, and honor; religious doctrine;
ideas concerning sovereignty, prop-
erty, and rights and duties; and aes-
thetic values and what constitutes
quality of life. There are also distinc-
tive understandings concerning the
nature of nature, of the place of hu-
mans in it, of proper behavior with
respect to it, and of equitable distri-
bution of its fruits, its costs, and its
1. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
Amendments, Pub. L. 95-372, 43 U.S.C. &sect;&sect;
1801-66 (1978).
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dangers. At levels yet deeper lie as-
sumptions about the nature of real-
ity : what is given, what requires
demonstration, what constitutes evi-
dence, how knowledge is gained.
Such loosely structured bodies of un-
derstandings and the conventions
and practices they inform are what
anthropologists call &dquo;cultures&dquo; and
what laypeople probably mean by such
phrases as &dquo;way of life&dquo; or &dquo;tradition.&dquo; 
&dquo;
Demographic and economic as-
pects of human systems are rela-
tively amenable to numerical repre-
sentation, but other aspects of society
and culture, including most of those
just listed, are not. They are no less
real for that, however, nor are they
less compelling as factors in human
affairs for, as vaguely articulated as
they often are, they command great
loyalty It is through such conceptions
that risks are not only perceived but
defined as such: such conceptions
specify what those who are at risk
understand to be at risk. Risk analy-
sis risks resistance or rejection if it
ignores such conceptions.
Third, although it is proper to
speak of a generalized American so-
ciety and culture, regional, ethnic,
class, and other differences play vari-
ations on that common theme. In
some instances-for example, Native
American groups-the local version
diverges widely from the generalized.
In all instances, the divergence is sig-
nificant. It follows that the features
of local sociocultural systems cannot
be taken for granted but must be
explored.
Fourth, it follows that impacts are
always in part relative to the particu-
lars of the affected sociocultural sys-
tem. It would be one thing for an oil
spill to decimate marine life in an
area exploited only by white commer-
cial fishermen and quite another to
decimate an equivalent fauna in
Bristol Bay, Alaska, which is fished
and hunted by Yupik-speaking Na-
tive Americans. For white fishermen
the loss of their fishery is economic.
For Yupik it is not simply economic.
Because subsistence activities are
central to their cultural reproduc-
tion, Yupik maintain that the de-
struction of their fishery would con-
stitute genocide. It would be more
accurate to call it ethnicide.
Given this complexity, the concep-
tion of the human environment on
which many impact studies have
been based seems impoverished. To
the extent that the concept has been
formulated at all, it seems to have
been operationalized only in terms of
economics, demographics, and gov-
ernment services. But adequate con-
sideration of ultracomplex human
systems, conventionally constituted as
they are, must also rely on social, cul-
tural (anthropological), and even psy-
chological analyses. An integrated
approach is required if information is
to be adequate to the gravity of such
actions as OCS development. This
framework needs to be sufficiently
comprehensive to allow the full range
of phenomena constituting human
systems to enter into analyses, and it
must be inclusive enough to take into
consideration the concerns of all in-
terested parties-especially those
who are likely to experience impacts
directly. It should, furthermore, be
sufficiently consistent to make for rea-
sonably commensurate studies, thus
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facilitating extrapolation, compari-
son, and generalization-in short, to
encourage learning from experience.
EIGHTEEN THESES ON THE
HUMAN ENVIRONMENT
More specific observations con-
cerning both the nature of what the
Outer C ontinental Shelf Lands Act as
Amended awkwardly terms &dquo;human
environments&dquo; and how they are to be
characterized are now possible.
1. Because human systems are ul-
tracomplex and always unique in
some particulars, the range of possi-
ble social, cultural, and economic ef-
fects of human activities on them
cannot be specified, even in principle,
in advance of studies based upon em-
pirical research. It is not legitimate
to stipulate a priori what qualifies as
a social, cultural, or economic impact.
The establishment of such specifica-
tions constitutes an attempt to legis-
late reality, but the degree to which
reality is amenable to such legisla-
tion is slight. Any limitation on the
nature of what counts as a real im-
pact-for example, that it is physical
or quantifiable or translated into
monetary terms-can only misrepre-
sent actual conditions. Given the re-
sponsiveness of human systems,
such misrepresentations are likely to
have political, legal, and social reper-
cussions, themselves properly re-
garded as impacts.
2. Humans respond not only to
events but also to information con-
cerning events. Indeed, in this age of
rapid communication, the preponder-
ance of response is not to direct obser-
vation of events but to news of them.
When news of events, rather than
events, provides stimuli, the events
need not have yet occurred for them
to have significant effects. Thus ap-
prehensions about undesirable de-
velopments, and not simply develop-
ments themselves, are real and
immediate effects of announcements
of possible developments. For exam-
ple, uncertainty concerning the fu-
ture of a coastal region ineluctably
increases from the moment a tract
appears on a Department of Interior
five-year hydrocarbon leasing plan
until a lease sale fails or until explo-
ration ends in either abandonment or
drilling. Uncertainty itself consti-
tutes a real impact. Both apprehen-
sion and uncertainty about future ac-
tivities and their consequences are
properly construed as impacts in the
present because they may alter the
current psychic, social, and perhaps
economic well-being of a community
and because they influence sub-
sequent attitudes and behavior.
3. It follows that in ultracomplex
human systems, some effects are not
simply linear outcomes of earlier ac-
tions. Between causes and effects-
that is, between perturbing factors
and responses to them-lie concep-
tions and evaluations of not only how
the world is constructed and how it
works but also how it should be con-
structed and how it should work. It is
in terms of the latter (values) that the
former (perceptions of actual condi-
tions) are understood. Such values
are, of course, culturally or even sub-
culturally variant.
4. The relationship between the
news of an event and the physical
characteristics of the event is not
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simple. News is not simply radiated
from an event, as light from a bulb,
but is subject to amplification, damp-
ening, editing, and distortion in
transmission, and it requires inter-
pretation by receivers.
Interpretation takes into account
the reliability and credibility of
transmitters and channels. Credibil-
ity can be a serious problem for both
transmitters and channels, and its
loss can be a consequence of their
responses to events. For instance,
OCS environmental impact state-
ments that an affected public takes to
be inadequate or misleading can dis-
credit their sources. There are, more-
over, grounds for believing that risks
are perceived to be higher when in-
formation sources are distrusted.
Such perceptions can lead people to
oppose even projects that could bene-
fit them.
5. If impacts include responses of
systems to perturbations, then the
legal, political, and organizational
responses of states, municipalities,
tribes, and interest groups to an-
nouncements of development plans
are themselves impacts, as are their
opportunity costs. Antagonisms de-
veloping between affected groups as
conflicts between their interests be-
come apparent, and conflicts between
such parties and the federal govern-
ment are also impacts.
6. The previous points suggest an
order in which impacts of different
natures become dominant. Earliest
effects-for example, those following
soon after the listing of a region on a
five-year OCS oil leasing plan-are
likely to include increased apprehen-
sion and uncertainty about the ef-
fects of future OCS development. Ap-
prehension is always unevenly dis-
tributed in populations, and immedi-
ate subsequent effects are likely to
include attempts by their more inter-
ested elements to raise concern
among the less sensitive. Activity of
state and local agencies and already
existing environmental groups and
trade associations soon increases,
and special state and local bureau-
cracies and special-purpose grass-
roots organizations often spring into
being. Conflict between those taking
various positions comes next. All of
this happens before any lease sale
takes place. Subsequent exploration
and production have their own ef-
fects, including disaster and its pos-
sibility, and so, finally, does termina-
tion, subsequent to which there may
be as yet unexplored residual effects.2
7. That certain important conse-
quences of development in general
and of gas- and oil-related OCS activ-
ity in particular can be strongly felt
well in advance of any actual physical
activity on the part of oil companies
may contradict some recent court de-
cisions. The general failure to recog-
nize prelease sale effects of OCS ac-
tivities maybe related to their typical
resistance to plausible quantitative
representation. More easily quantifi-
able impacts generally come later in
2. See W. R. Freudenburg and R. Gram-
ling, "Community Impacts of Technological
Change: Toward a Longitudinal Perspective,"
Social Forces, 70:937-57 (1992); R. A. Rap-
paport, "The Human Environment: Appendix
B,"inAssessmentofthe U.S. Outer Continental
Shelf Environmental Studies Program, vol. 3,
Social and Economic Studies, by Committee to
Review the Outer Continental Shelf Environ-
mental Studies Program, Socioeconomics Panel
(Washington, DC: National Academy Press,
1992).
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the sequence. It may be because early
effects resist representation in
terms-such as monetary-familiar
to many or most administrators that
public awareness of them has been
slight.
8. Although some aspects of events
and their consequences are metrical
in nature, or easily represented in
numerical terms, other aspects of the
same or other events cannot be so
represented. It should be clear that a
good many significant effects of OCS
and other developments-the psy-
chic and social tensions that attend
uncertainty, or anger at and aliena-
tion from the government-cannot be
represented adequately, or even at
all, in quantitative terms of any sort,
let alone monetary terms.
The prevalence of opinions should,
of course, be sampled. It is one thing,
however, to quantify the prevalence
of particular opinions on particular
issues as they may be indicated by
responses to the limited range of
choices offered by particular ques-
tions asked at particular moments in
an ever changing history, and it is
another to grasp the underlying
cognitive structures out of which
these relatively evanescent opinions
emerge in response to unfolding
events. Attempts to force the repre-
sentation of such structures into in-
appropriately quantitative terms or,
alternatively, to dismiss them be-
cause they cannot be quantified is to
misrepresent reality. The aesthetic
considerations of affected popula-
tions, for instance, or violations of
their religious beliefs or of their con-
ceptions of equity or even of their
vague conceptions of the good life
cannot be ruled inadmissible be-
cause they resist quantitative repre-
sentation, for they are likely to be
those aspects of their lives that these
populations take to be most seriously
at risk. Such considerations cannot
be disqualified as mere preferences
or prejudices of uninformed laypeo-
ple. They are embedded in views of
the world no more and no less arbi-
trary than other views of the world,
and as such have valid claims on re-
ality More decisively, they are social
facts and as such serve as grounds for
action.
In sum, metrical representation-
including the results of opinion sur-
veys-should be pushed to the limits
of plausibility but no further, and it
is necessary to recognize that some
considerations, often decisive ones,
lie beyond the reach of plausible nu-
merical representation. Attempts to
reduce radically unmeasurable com-
ponents of the world to common met-
rics preliminary to bottom-line calcu-
lations are not to be justified as aids
to clear thinking-the clarity and
certainty so claimed are false.
9. The term &dquo;significant&dquo; in point 8
is meant in both its major senses:
both &dquo;consequential&dquo; and &dquo;meaning-
ful.&dquo; To say that a phenomenon is
meaningful is to say that it enters
into the motivational processes of ac-
tors. This implies that values are of
crucial importance in risk analysis
and that their consideration cannot
be avoided. Risk assessment cannot
be value free because values define
what is at risk, and what is at risk
may be values themselves.
In some contexts, the conception of
value, particularly when accompanied
by a modifier-for example, &dquo;food
value&dquo;-seems intrinsically metrical.
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But the term also refers to such con-
ceptions as truth, honor, honesty, in-
tegrity, life, liberty, and happiness.
Two subsidiary points follow.
First, there is a radical incompati-
bility between most such values and
metrics of any sort, and an absolute
contradiction between some of them
and monetary valorization, a contra-
diction indicated by such questions
as &dquo;How much money is your integ-
rity (or honesty or vote) worth?&dquo; Any
assignment of monetary metrics to
such values renders them false. It
follows that attempts to mitigate the
violation of strongly held values
through cash awards may be taken
by those to whom they are offered as
insults heaped on previous injuries.
The Shoshone, for instance, have re-
fused to accept a cash award of tens
of millions of dollars as compensation
for what they construe to be seizure
of their lands by the federal govern-
ment in violation of the Ruby Valley
Treaty of 1863. Similarly, many peo-
ple in Nevada characterized as at-
tempted bribery the suggestion that
they receive large cash payments in
return for accepting a national nu-
clear waste repository.
Second, fundamental or basic val-
ues tend to be low in specificity What,
after all, constitutes liberty or happi-
ness or, for that matter, life? To say,
however, that values are not specific
or even vague does not say that they
are not cogent, or even decisive, in the
formation of positions on which social
actors stand and from which they un-
derstand the world and act in it. Fur-
thermore, it may even be that the
vagueness of a value and the strength
of the motivations it engenders are
directly correlated. People will sacri-
fice themselves to protect whatever
they mean by &dquo;liberty&dquo; or &dquo;democ-
racy&dquo; but not to balance the budget of
the federal government.
10. A general value of sufficient
significance to warrant special men-
tion is fairness. Americans are likely
to take such actions as OCS oil and
gas development leasing to be in
their nature unfair. First, affected
populations are quick to perceive that
the most substantial benefits of de-
velopment are likely to flow to parties
other than those most directly ex-
posed to attendant risks. Second, and
even deeper, it seems that the atti-
tude of local publics to local land is
that it is in some sense theirs. That a
private or alien interest can curtail or
endanger their use of what they see
as their own-whether private prop-
erty or public amenity-violates not
only a deep sense of right but possibly
also a deep sense of connection to
place: &dquo;Who are they to endanger our
wetlands (or fish or beach)?&dquo; Such
sense of violation and its attendant
feelings of outrage and alienation are
properly regarded as possible impacts
of such development, as are any po-
litical reactions that ensue.
11. The next point is related. Com-
munities may take projected develop-
ments to endanger something that
may seem even vaguer and more gen-
eral than fundamental values. They
may refer to whatever it is as their
&dquo;way of life,&dquo; or they might use the
slightly more esoteric term, &dquo;cul-
ture.&dquo; At the heart of a culture or way
of life are symbolically mediated and
socially constructed conceptions that
are realized, maintained, and restruc-
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tured through customary action. We
have already noted that among cer-
tain Native Americans, such custom-
ary actions involve subsistence ac-
tivities. Hunting and fishing are,
thus, among the main means by
which Intuit, Aleut, and other indige-
nous cultures are kept alive, and per-
ceived threats to them will therefore
be bitterly resented and resisted. It
need hardly be said that there is no
valid way to assign a monetary value
to a culture. Its destruction, Yupik
insist, would be unmitigable.
Violations of a community’s val-
ues, or threats to its way of life, must
be understood to constitute, in and of
themselves, serious impacts on that
community To elaborate an earlier
suggestion, the less amenable to met-
rical representation and the vaguer
the threatened value, the stronger
the response to its violation, for in
such instances the defenders under-
stand themselves to be acting on gen-
eral principle rather than out of per-
sonal interest.
12. It follows that threats to a com-
munity’s conceptions of its rights, to
its conceptions of justice and equity,
to its general way of life, or to its basic
canons of reality often take prece-
dence over material considerations in
the formulation of action. Further-
more, actions so undertaken are
likely to be more highly charged emo-
tionally, more physical, and more ag-
gressive than those undertaken in
the service of economic or material
advantage. The higher principles in-
voked in response to perceived
threats to a way of life or its highly
valued constituents seem to license,
or even to sanctify, forms of action
that the actors themselves would in
other circumstances condemn. We may
recall here civil disobedience cam-
paigns in the American south, and
otherwise law-abiding citizens
breaking laws in pro-choice versus
pro-life confrontations. Even when,
or especially when, such actions are
by law criminal, they may be viewed
by their partisans as legitimate or
even heroic.
13. This account proposes that
when a community’s concerns are ig-
nored by analysts and decision mak-
ers, the matters at issue change. The
dominant issues become matters of
high principle. When conflicts are es-
calated to the level of high principle,
they are no longer objective disagree-
ments resolvable by fact, logic, or
even self-interest. Rather, in the
principled mode an economic form of
rationality is replaced by claims to
virtue vouchsafed by self-sacrifice.
Escalation into the principled mode
is a risk of development activity
14. An implication of the discus-
sion so far is that whether a commu-
nity’s understanding of the world’s
nature, or whether its values con-
cerning it, is &dquo;realistic&dquo; in terms of
&dquo;objective&dquo; criteria established by pu-
tatively disinterested analysts, or
whether the community’s fears are,
in the view of analysts or officials,
fanciful is, in some degree, beside the
point. Impacts and risks are, in con-
siderable degree, to be understood
relative to the affected community’s
definitions of reality. The concerns of
local people must therefore be given
full and respectful treatment because
it is the environment as these people
conceive it that, as far as they are
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concerned, will be affected, and it is
in terms of these understandings
that the community responds to in-
trusions. Failure to treat local under-
standings seriously risks widespread
citizen alienation and anger, political
and legal action, and even threats of
violence.
15. Note, however, the qualifica-
tions &dquo;in some degree&dquo; and &dquo;in con-
siderable degree.&dquo; It would be a se-
rious error to suppose that risks and
impacts are to be defined only in
relation to the community’s under-
standings, for many serious conse-
quences may be unforeseen by those
who will be exposed to them. It is
the responsibility of those who pre-
pare environmental impact state-
ments not only to grant reality to the
concerns of affected communities but
also to bring to those communities’
attention risks that they might not
perceive.
16. It follows that impact studies
themselves are not free of possible
impacts. For an impact statement to
ignore, dismiss, disqualify, underes-
timate, or, in the view of affected par-
ties, misrepresent or represent in-
adequately their concerns is for the
statement itself to provide evidence
to those affected parties that they are
being unjustly treated. It is both
plausible and prudent to assume that
the community will respond to per-
ceptions of injustice in whatever ways
are available and that they deem ap-
propriate. Active responses can in-
clude emigrating (likely when strong
opposition combines with the sense of
powerlessness and failure of trust in
the institutions responsible); voting
those viewed as responsible out of
office; or, even more aggressive, form-
ing ad hoc organizations, demon-
strating, or even committing sabotage.
That such overt actions fail to ma-
terialize should not be taken to indi-
cate unambiguously that projected
developments or environmental im-
pact statements have elicited no re-
sponses, for responses can include
cognitive and attitudinal effects ex-
pressing themselves in such stress-
related phenomena as substance
abuse, domestic violence, racial an-
tagonism, and other forms of social
pathology
17. Among the most significant
components of environmental impact
statements, as far as affected com-
munities are concerned, may well be
estimates concerning the probability
and magnitude of disasters. If, for
example, the probability of oil spills
is represented-rightly or wrongly-
to be much lower than the common
sense of a coastal community pro-
jects, or if their effects are, in the
community’s view, significantly un-
derestimated, and if these projec-
tions cannot be plausibly justified,
the trustworthiness of the institu-
tions preparing the impact statement
may be at risk. Distrust may be con-
tagious, spreading from the specific
agency preparing the statement-for
example, the Minerals Management
Service-to the department of which
it is a part-in this case, Interior-or
even to the federal government gen-
erally Impact statements that do not
win the credence of affected commu-
nities may thus put trust in govern-
ment as a whole at risk. Undermin-
ing confidence in government and
even questioning the legitimacy of
government itself are thus possible
risks of impact studies themselves.
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18. The last point alluded to &dquo;af-
fected communities,&dquo; but full analyti-
cal isolation of &dquo;affected communi-
ties&dquo; is impossible if the term is
understood to include all of those that
take themselves to be in some way
threatened and all who respond in
some way Communities in Alaska
were most affected by the EaGxon Val-
dez oil spill, but there were, and will
continue to be, responses to the Alas-
kan events in communities distant
from Alaska. Such nonlocal re-
sponses must be included in any se-
rious and comprehensive account of
impacts.
The responses of those distant
from Prince William Sound have var-
ied in ways that can be fully grasped
only through empirical research, but
it can be suggested that they have
combined to produce a cognitive, so-
cial, political, cultural, and perhaps
even economic environment increas-
ingly hostile to OCS activity. To use a
medical metaphor, the Exxon Valdez
may have inoculated the society
against OCS development, stimulat-
ing organizational, cultural, cogni-
tive, and political antibodies against
it. Subsequent spills could be re-
garded as booster shots. The anti-
body effect must be included among
the possible impacts of OCS activity.
CONCLUSION
If modern science is based upon
the objectivity of disinterested ob-
servers radically detached from the
systems concerning which they seek
to develop dispassionate theoretical
understanding through replicable
empirical procedures, then risk and
impact analysis cannot qualify as
modem science. Analysts are never
radically separated from the systems
they observe and, furthermore, those
systems are composed of human sub-
jects with cognitive capacities equal
to, and local knowledge usually
greater than, those of the analysts.
As such, they are likely to respond to
analyses in highly engaged ways. In
sum, risk and impact analyses are
themselves interventions in the sys-
tems they seek to understand. This
does not necessarily impeach their
validity, unless it impeaches the va-
lidity ofvirtually all sciences this side
of extragalactic astronomy. (Particle
physics, after all, has its Heisenberg
principle.) Nor does it destroy
the usefulness of such analyses,
although their nature counsels hu-
mility and caution and requires open-
ness to local understandings.
If risk and impact analysis does
not qualify as a modern science, it
does qualify for inclusion in what
Stephen Toulmin has called &dquo;post-
modern science,&dquo;’ which, he argues,
differs from modern science in re-
turning observers to the systems
from which modern science exiled
them, and which is as concerned with
praxis as theory As such, it is legiti-
mately interventionist, but as such it
also eschews claims of value neutral-
ity, for intervention, unless it is mere
clumsy intrusion, is directed toward
the achievement of some sort of state,
condition, or goal. All of this further
entails openness to the inside knowl-
edge and understandings of subjects
3. Stephen Toulmin, The Return to Cos-
mology : Post-Modern Science and Natural
Theology (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1982).
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as well as to the objective outside
knowledge of analysts.
The practice of postmodern sci-
ence will not be easy, but it may be
liberating. It may also be that the
very characteristics of risk and im-
pact analysis that make it dubious
as modern science suit it admirably
for leadership among postmodern
sciences.
